While CRM (Customer Relationship Management) practices are being adopted widely, research suggests that most CRM programmes fail in their dual objective of creating superior customer value and increasing profits for the firm.
moved to a marketing company to work on corporate development and acquisitions, subsequently transferring into the consultancy arm of the same business group. Lynette is a Registered Representative of the London Stock Exchange and is the only woman in the UK to have passed the Fellowship examinations of the Society of Investment Professionals. She is co-author of "Customer Relationship Management: The Business Case", Butterworth-Heinemann.
Introduction
The financial framework most often used in preparing business cases for Customer Relationship Management (CRM) may, perversely, inhibit such programmes from achieving their strategic and business objectives. Arguably, the traditional cash-flow analyses based upon Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and Net Present Value (NPV) calculations are too limited a basis on which to make CRM investment decisions. This is because they undervalue returns and focus management attention on short-term cash-flow when, perhaps, the main benefits of customer relationship investments lie in building a strategic customer relationship asset. In other words, the long-term benefits of closer, deeper relationships with selected customers are difficult to quantify in cash terms since they can lead to reductions in the volatility of sales, market uncertainty and business risk.
Given that CRM investments are usually strategically significant, with a value in the range of $60 million to $200 million for a highly complex installation which can take up to 3 years to install (Ebner et al, 2002 1 ), the risk of business failure needs to be fully quantified. In the 1990s, the climate for CRM investment was more favourable and firms invested without fully considering these risks (Rigby et al, 2002 2 ). Their research suggests that 55% of all CRM projects haven't produced results, and some 20% of users report actual damage to long-standing customer relationships.
Today, business leaders are demanding a more rigorous approach to developing and presenting the business case for CRM investment. As a consequence, the senior managers involved in delivering the business case, usually a project team drawn from Marketing, Sales, IT and Customer Service, need to address fully the questions, "What steps can we take to reduce the uncertainty in the business case for CRM?" and "How do we reduce the risk of business failure if we adopt a more customer-centric approach through CRM? "
In this paper, we first identify the potential benefits of CRM investments to both customers and the firm. Then we explore the limitations of Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and Net Present Value (NPV) in assessing how the CRM business case is presented. To counter the problems of risk and uncertainty left largely unanswered by a cash-flow analysis, we introduce the idea of Real Options as a risk-reduction step to help build the business case for CRM investment. This we do through a simulated case study of a telecom. equipment manufacturer actively considering a CRM investment. Initially, we develop a range of business case scenarios for the firm, together with a cash-flow calculation for each. These scenarios show wide variability, depending upon the business assumptions made, and we conclude that they significantly undervalue the likely effects of the firm's CRM investment and look very high risk indeed.
To help mitigate the uncertainty of such a large-scale investment, we introduce the idea of using Real Options in conjunction with traditional cash flow analysis to quantify the effects of trialling CRM before scale up as an alternative pathway for building the case for CRM investment. Although Real Options have been used to manage other IT investment risks (Benaroch, 2002 3 ), as far as we are aware, this is the first time Real
Options have been applied in the context of a CRM investment.
We close the paper by exploring the managerial implications of how this combination of cash-flow and Real Options helps reduce uncertainty in the CRM investment decision by introducing greater flexibility and a fact-based means of quantifying the business benefits.
The Promise of CRM
The promise of customer relationship management is captivating. For customers, CRM offers the potential for customised solutions, superior service and reduced costs over the lifetime of their relationship with the firm since shared knowledge of their business strategy, buying preferences and processes can be developed in a more systematic fashion. For the firm, the ability to gather customer data swiftly, identify the most valuable customers over time and increase customer retention through CRM is a highly desirable strategy since it positively impacts the firm's profitability (Reinartz et al, 2004 4 ). Reinartz and co-researchers define CRM as "a systematic process to manage customer relationship initiation, maintenance and termination across all customer contact points to maximize the value of the relationship portfolio". Thus, CRM offers a potential win: win scenario for both the firm and its customers. However, the underlying reasons why both customers and firms choose to restrict the width of their business relationships require a fuller explanation of the mutual benefits of CRM from the perspective of the customer and of the business.
The customer perspective
Economic theory predicts that customers will buy from many suppliers to reduce costs and improve service (Palmer, 2000 5 ). In reality, they willingly restrict their choice to a few preferred suppliers or brands (Gummesson, 1998 6 ; Sheth, 1995 7 ) with whom they either trust or collaborate closely (Christopher, 1998 8 , pp.190-191) .
Whilst it seems that customers act contrary to their best economic interests, economists acknowledge that perhaps customers are acting rationally and avoiding transaction costs through relationships (Williamson, 1981 9 ). Even where transaction costs are not a major consideration, customers may yet calculate that the total lifecycle costs of owning certain assets or procuring services are better managed through relationships (Degerature et al., 1999 10 ).
In some markets, customer retention can be explained through the avoidance of switching costs; costs associated with switching from one product or service to a new one (Shapiro and Varian, 1998 11 In summary, many customers prefer to deal with a small core of supplier-partners than to procure important supplies in the open market. Relationships are considered to add value and reduce costs, and buyers demonstrate a preference for building stable relationships over pure market transactions for all but straight commodities or low risk purchases.
The business perspective
In recent years, businesses have paid increasing attention to the profit impact of customer retention (Wyner, 1996 14 ; Johnson, 2002 15 ). Reichheld (1996 16 ) makes a compelling argument that it is more profitable to focus on retaining customers rather than just maximising market share. Reichheld also maintains that these effects increase over time, so that the profitability of retained customers grows exponentially. Small changes in customer retention rates create a disproportionate increase in profitability.
It is the incentive of increasing customer retention and profitability through better CRM practices which often drives firms to develop a more customer-centric strategy.
However, effective customer retention is contingent upon market segmentation as the starting point for the development of a firm's CRM strategy (Corner, 2002a 17 While the promise of CRM is beguiling, the concomitant benefits of a more customercentric strategy can only be achieved through investing in technology, people and processes; both these CRM investment costs and the risk of business failure throughout the transition period can be very high.
Next, we explore what the main assumptions are in developing the business case for CRM and how the financial analysis is usually presented.
Value Exchange and the CRM Business Case
CRM creates symbiotic value for both customers and the business. The more customers 'teach' their suppliers, the more these businesses can support and respond to them. This value exchange process lies behind the most critical business assumptions about the CRM business case:
1 Trust is developed. Research suggests trust is developed through repeated experiences that meet or exceed customer expectations (Constable, 1998 23 ).
2 The CRM programme has integrity. Customers will continue 'teaching' firms about their needs and preferences for as long as they perceive benefit and therefore the CRM business plan must identify how the firm will learn and respond.
3 There is mutual commitment. The business case must identify how and why customer commitment will increase over time, and how this increased commitment results in increased retention and reduced churn (Corner, 2002b 24 Sophisticated users of DCF estimate a residual value for the asset at the end of the planning period.
NPV is based upon estimated incremental cash-flows that are uncertain and there are no guarantees that the business case will be delivered once the programme(s) starts.
However, the forecasting process assumes that the business is a portfolio decision maker, making a series of investment decisions based on expected value. This is a risk reduction strategy; the business makes a large number of investments, none of which will expose it to unacceptable risk levels (Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 1995 32 ). If each business case is honestly made, then investments that return less than forecast are balanced by those that exceed their estimates. Across a large number of investments, provided the charge for capital is appropriate, the use of DCF and NPV calculations should lead to decisions that increase shareholder value. . In other words, the total value of the project is the NPV plus the value of the option to scale up, scale down, or to pull out (Exhibit A). 
Limitations of Using

Insert Exhibit A near here
Estimating the CRM Business Case Using DCF
The Finance Director had advised Mary to use 10-year cash flow forecast with a discount rate of 15%. The costs of implementing a comprehensive CRM programme at Westel are easy to estimate; £227 M over ten years of which £129 M would be spent in the first three years alone (see notes to Appendix 1 for more details of these costs under "Successful CRM"). The Team is less confident about estimating incremental revenue. They estimate that turnover could increase dramatically through more effective cross-selling, customers acting as reference sites and customers directing Westel to develop as yet unforeseen new products and services. Mary is also convinced that Westel would reduce marketing and sales costs because she knows it is less expensive to serve retained customers than to continually recruit new ones. Although research costs would also rise, revenue would rise faster because customers would be helping to direct research thus making it more cost-effective. Finally, the Team believes that developing more comprehensive, long-term customer solutions as a result of a CRM programme would undoubtedly lead to an increase in gross margins.
In preparing the business case, the Team estimates the NPV of three scenarios:
1. "Successful CRM": The full CRM programme increases turnover and margin dramatically. Research, sales and marketing expenditures increase in absolute terms but fall as a percentage of turnover. The result of these effects is that in 10 years Westel almost doubles its turnover and increases its profit four-fold. Despite the dramatic difference in the outcomes generated by the three scenarios, the NPV estimates demonstrate only a small difference between them in value ( Figure 1 ). This is particularly true when comparing the "Successful CRM" and "No Change" scenarios, the comparison most salient to the Board.
Insert figure 1
On an NPV basis alone, one cannot justify the huge investment in CRM that the Team believes is necessary for Westel's future prosperity. The problem is that nobody can prove with any credibility how well CRM will work or how much risk the business is at from competition. 
Analysis of the Westel's CRM Business Case
Westel needs to become customer-centric. But the only way to make a compelling business case based upon NPV is to make heroic assumptions about increased revenue, reduced cost and the risks of 'do nothing'. Forecasting large increases in revenue based on beliefs, experts' claims and hard-to-verify estimates of best practice is risky.
Moreover, it assumes that you know the outcome of stronger customer relationships before entering into them. Locking Westel into pre-identified, cross-selling programmes and new product launches risks compromising the trust and learning which is at the heart of CRM. Investing more in the current business practices might generate more immediate return. Smaller initial investments giving short-term returns are favoured in NPV calculations because the discount rate -the time value of money -dramatically reduces benefits that are realised only in the long term.
But what will happen to Westel if Mary and Board are right about the increased competitive threat? How should senior managers assess the risk of being too cautious? If they fail to implement CRM now, can they come back later or will they have missed the chance forever?
DCF, not surprisingly, is best used when the situation can be described in cash flow terms. It fails to value what Westel will learn from its customers -a major CRM benefit.
It also favours the short over the long term. DCF/NPV is not good at assessing the longer term, and potentially fatal risk facing Westel. If the competitive threat materialises, then DCF will lead Westel to seriously underestimate the benefits of the CRM investment case and by the time this is understood, it may be too late to implement the far-reaching changes needed to respond in a timely fashion.
The Westel Solution: Applying Real Options
The Team should avoid the use of heroic assumptions in the business. They are likely to be controversial when held up to scrutiny by experienced directors and the sales function.
Moreover, if they are accepted, the pressure for immediate sales increases to customers will undermine any serious attempt at learning and responding to customers flexibly. The problem Mary faces is how to present financial data in a manner that promotes an intelligent discussion with the Board, identifies the key assumptions and risks of the investment and builds an informed consensus on the basis of valid information.
Reviewing the project, the Team generates a fourth scenario. Rather than an all-ornothing rollout of CRM, they identify a limited number of key accounts with which CRM will be trialled. The ability to trial CRM indicates that a Real Option on CRM is present.
The value of this option is the value of flexibility which reduces the risks associated with the CRM investment whilst increasing senior manager's learning about the returns of CRM for the firm. The Team estimates that it will take three years to implement and "read" the CRM trial after which time, the Board can make the decision whether or not to discontinue the trial (or scale it up) according to the firmer evidence provided by the To find the relevant column, the asset value (£107m) must be divided by the present value of the exercise price (£195m discounted at r of 15% = £102.2m). This comes to 1.05 (£107m/£102.2m).
To find the relevant row, the volatility of the underlying asset must be multiplied by the square root of the time period for which the option is available (.32 x √3) = 0.554.
Applying these numbers to the look-up tables, the Team is able to determine that the value of Westel's CRM option is approximately £25 M.
Mary's argument to the Board is summarised in Figure 4 which shows the NPV of each scenario, including the new scenario four, Trial CRM, which also has an option value.
When the value of the flexibility provided by trialling CRM is added to the cash flow generated, the total value of scenario four is very marginally lower than the potentially much higher-risk option, scenario one, of rolling out a full CRM project immediately.
Insert figure 4
By calculating the value of Westel's CRM option, the Team is in a much stronger position to recommend that the firm market tests CRM with a limited number of customers over a three year period in order to validate the business case assumptions about revenue and costs. The firm should then be in the position to implement a full-scale CRM programme shortly afterwards. With three years experience of CRM, Westel will be able to reduce the wide spread in NPV estimates for CRM. In other words, the firm will be able to reduce the risk of its CRM investment. This risk will also be reduced through market testing of CRM that will allow Westel to build competencies, resources and a track record of learning relationships with customers.
The discussion of risk in respect of scenario one, Successful CRM, raises an issue about the interest rate used in the calculations. The same interest rate is used in all four scenarios. However, common sense suggests that the Successful CRM scenario is more risky than the others and, as such, it should attract a higher cost of capital (discount rate).
This would have the effect of reducing the NPV of Successful CRM whilst increasing the option value associated with Trial CRM since, as discussed above, the value of a Real Option varies positively with the interest rate. Thus, the approach taken to valuing
Westel's CRM option may be slightly conservative.
The identification of a supportable financial value for the factors, which are not captured in the DCF, allows the Board to engage in an informed debate and make a rational assessment of the value of CRM. It addresses the Finance Director's concern about adding such values into a DCF analysis but does not fall into the trap of either ignoring the value or incorporating it in a non-transparent manner through heroic sales growth assumptions.
Managerial Implications of using Real Options for CRM Project Evaluation
There are two important implications for CRM project managers concerning how they make the business case for CRM and the way in which they structure and implement subsequent CRM programmes. Many CRM projects fail, indicating that they are risky. In these circumstances, making a case using DCF / NPV will misrepresent the real value of projects that contain options. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the option value. The CRM business case is a major strategic document and not merely a financial forecasting exercise. It represents a fundamental change to the business and should be evaluated as a strategic, risky and contingent investment in an unknown future. The challenge for senior managers is to promote a discussion that identifies the extent to which their business must move from a traditional "make and sell" model to "listen and respond" in an unknown future and real options thinking can help to generate this discussion.
The second implication concerns the way in which managers structure and implement CRM programmes. The Westel case illustrates the benefits of options thinking and of structuring CRM programmes to create options to defer, pilot or upscale major CRM investments. Without options thinking, companies may fail to build into the programme sufficient flexibility to learn from customers, which could compromise the huge investment that CRM requires. It can, therefore, enable a rational discussion of risk and flexibility in the search to optimise the structuring of CRM investments and the implementation of programmes. Moreover, in the time before the option must be exercised, the three years of the Westel Trial CRM in this case, senior management attention will be focused on validating the key assumptions built into the business case. The value of an option is given by the equation:
where e is an exponential constant
The value of the option is related positively to all these factors except the second, the exercise price (E). In other words, the bigger the value of the underlying asset (P s ), the higher the interest rate (r), the longer the period for which the option is available (t), and the greater the volatility in value of the underlying asset (N d ), the higher the value of the option is to buy (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999 39 ). 
2: No Change Scenario
Revenue Current 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 Increased "cross sell" New referrals New business ideas Total Revenue 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Gross 
Revenue
This scenario assumes that the current revenue of £500M is successfully defended through CRM. This base is augmented by layers of incremental revenues identified in the case. The incremental revenues are estimates generated by Mary in conjunction with partners in Sales and outside consultants with experience in CRM programme development. In order of importance, these incremental revenues are:
 Increased cross selling to current customers. The immediate focus of CRM is to extend and enhance that which Westel sells to its customers, leveraging its good reputation and incumbency in major users of telecoms equipment. Whilst there are some revenues generated in year 1, the impact of cross selling will grow over subsequent years as Westel learns how to profit from enhanced relationships. The rate of revenue growth decreases in the final years of the 10 year period to reflect eventual diminishing returns from cross selling.
 New referrals. The CRM programme will identify those customers for whom Westel is adding the most value and where the relationship is strongestconverting customers' good will towards Westel into sales leads, references and general endorsement of Westel's qualities. Referrals, references and endorsements are important win-bidding developments for large telecoms infrastructure projects, given the amount of money and risk they entail. The referral effect also starts slowly, grows more rapidly for a few years and then tails off in the later years of the forecasted period.
 New business ideas. This is the most difficult area to estimate as it estimates the ability of Westel to exploit commercially ideas that are generated through learning from future customer interactions. The revenue generation is lagged to the learning to reflect the time it takes to work more intimately with clients, develop new ideas with them, assess their wider commercial potential and introduce the new ideas to a larger number of customers. The forecast suggests that it will take almost four years to realise any significant income from this form of learning from customers.
Gross margin
CRM will allow Westel to allocate better its resources and re-engineer its business processes to provide more of what its best customers value and less of what customers do not appreciate or are unwilling to pay for. This better matching of resources and processes to customer value will reduce costs incurred that add little value and allow
Westel to produce more valued services and products, which all else being equal, should sell at premium prices. The revenue from this is assumed to be lagged by one year to the start of CRM but adds one-half point of margin thereafter. The final figure of 44.5% is considered by Mary to be achievable in consideration of her analysis of best-practice competitors.
Other Costs
These increase in absolute terms over 10 years but not as fast as income. For example, R&D increases from its current level of £75 M (15% of £500 M turnover) to £107.5 M (12.5% of year 10 turnover). Moreover, R&D priorities will be more targeted on specific customer opportunities and hence less speculative and more cost-effective.
Incremental CRM Costs
Technology
This comprises CRM software implementation over 18 months. The major components are sales force automation, new customer contact (call) centre, enhanced web access, new customer database, new database analysis tools and improved integration of the contact centre with Westel's logistic and billing systems. Integrating these new sales, marketing and service systems together and then to the back office support systems is a major systems development. The logistics and billing systems had not been built to integrate seamlessly into new, state-of-the-art front office systems that Westel would need and would require extensive use of outside systems development and integration consultants. The new front office equipment would stretch existing computer hardware and servers beyond their capability and new equipment would be needed.
The key investments are as follows:
New sales systems to 1000 field sales people £10,000,000 New lap tops to field sales people 5,000,000 New sales systems to 500 desk based sales people 2,500,000 New service software for 1000 service people 5,000,000 New marketing systems for 500 marketers 2,500,000 Other new hardware (servers, LANs, etc) 2,500,000 New database and analytical tools 5,000,000 Systems integration, process development (consulting fees) 17,500,000 Upgrades to logistics and billing systems 15,000,000 Total 65,000,000
The investment was front loaded with £40M in the first year and £25 M in year two. Commencing in year three, IT estimated an ongoing cost of £5 M per annum for software upgrades, license fees and miscellaneous new maintenance costs.
Reorganisation
The sales force would be reorganised into profit-responsible customer teams and lead Westel's business and product planning processes. It would need new competencies in customer development, planning, financial analysis, risk assessment and budgeting. Product groups would need a reorientation to adapt a more "listen and serve" approach to their jobs. This represented the biggest-ever change for Westel's Sales organisation in its history. After advice from change-management consulting firms, Mary estimated an 18 month implementation of the change with £15 million, one-off cost spread equally over the period; £10 million in year one and £5 million in the second year. The costs relate to hiring outside change-management consultants and facilities, food and travel for the attendant workshops and re-training sessions.
People
Not all the current Westel people would be able and or willing to make the transition from a product to a customer-led structure. Mary estimated that 20% of the current marketing and sales people would either leave or be replaced during the first 18 months of the CRM implementation. Mary worked with HR specialists to estimate the costs involved. In considering the people, their flexibility and ongoing level of staff turnover, the specialists suggest a first year cost of £10 million relating to personal coaching and training for those that can make the transition to key account management, coaching of others to consider other opportunities within Westel and severance pay for those that will neither make the transition to the new organisation nor find an acceptable position elsewhere. There will be only limited recruitment from the outside in the first year of the CRM programme to allow Westel people the best opportunity and minimise disruption. Thereafter, there is a cost of £5M per annum for recruiting new people and additional severance pay.
Marketing
Westel did not traditionally spend heavily in marketing, instead relying on its reputation and sales force for reputation and positioning. Current marketing budgets were hard to estimate as spending was fragmented across individual product groups and not always identified as marketing. Mary was convinced that repositioning Westel from hardware vendor to solutions-partner would require a much larger investment in marketing communications behind the corporate brand. Westel had never before invested specifically in corporate brand building.
During the first two years of the change programme, Mary budgeted for a £20 million global communication programme directed at customers and opinion-formers. The objectives of the communication programme were to promote the new strategy and discourage rumours that Westel lacks a clear strategy. Thereafter marketing budgets would fall to approx. £4 million per annum, but not to the very low current levels. Mary felt that as Westel changed its focus from product-marketing to customersolutions, it would need to maintain a strong corporate brand to endorse its credentials as a long-term business partner.
Notes for Appendix 1: Trial CRM
Mary is able to identify a limited number of customers with whom Westel can engage in the type of relationship that is planned for all customers under the "successful CRM scenario". The technology, reorganisation, people and marketing investments required are as per above, but on a much smaller scale. Many of the software solutions can be delayed during the trial in favour of enhancements to current systems and additional staff. These short-term fixes are not scaleable to support all of Westel's business but can be operated for a limited time for a limited number of companies.
This scenario illustrates a three year investment that is successful and hence allows Westel to extend CRM across the company in year 4. The slower pace of implementation is actually less expensive in a few areas over a four year period because it avoids the disruptiveness of quick-paced, major change (e.g. People costs). However the major assumptions about the extent and pace of incremental revenue development and technology costs are very similar to those used in the successful CRM scenario albeit lagged to reflect the three year test market.
